COMMENTS
The change in rhetoric is never ending. However, the process serves to remind that exorcising the specter of racial violence is a matter of redefining the
larger issues of freedom and equality as well as obtaining effective enforcement
of civil rights law.
THE NON-COMMUNIST AFFIDAVIT REQUIREMENT OF THE
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
Recent developments have brought into focus the basic conflict which exists
between the peculiar mechanism chosen by Congress to rid unions of Communist officers and the broader objectives of the amended National Labor
Relations Act., Section 9 (h) of that Act' denies the use of National Labor
Relations Board facilities to unions whose officers fail to file non-Communist
affidavits.3 Fundamental to the Act's objective of industrial harmony is the
establishment of orderly procedures for enforcing the obligations it imposes
upon employers.4 In applying Section 9(h), the Board and the courts often
must choose between sacrificing the collective bargaining principle and strengthening the position of union officers who fail to comply with the filing requirements. s
X49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 6i Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 41 (Supp., 195o). In
upholding the constitutionality of the provision, the Supreme Court declared that the purpose
of Congress was to eliminate the "political" strike. "Substantial amounts of evidence were
presented to various committees of Congress ... that Communist leaders of labor unions
had in the past and would continue in the future to subordinate legitimate trade union objectives to obstructive strikes when dictated by Party leaders, often in support of the policies of
a foreign government." American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 388
(1950).
2Labor Management Relations Act of i947, § 9(h), 61 Stat. 146 (X947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ i39(h) (Supp., 195o).
3 The Section is one of three which require unions to report various types of information.
Sections 9(f) and 9(g) require financial and organizational reports of unions seeking the use
of NLRB machinery. 61 Stat. 145, 146 (i947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ i59(f), i59(g) (Supp., 1950).
While attention in this note has been focused upon the non-Communist affidavit, most of the
disabilities that attach to noncompliance refer as well to these other filing requirements.
4 The declaration of policy, for example, states that "[i]t is the purpose and policy of this
Act, in order to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both
employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the
other.. . . Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § z (b), 6i Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ i5i(b) (Supp., 195o).
5 Opponents of the measure early pointed out the nature of the conflict involved. In his
message to Congress vetoing the Act, President Truman stated: "Such a union would have to
win all its objectives by strike rather than by orderly procedure under the law. The union and
the affected industry would be disrupted for perhaps a long period of time while violent electioneering, charges and counter-charges split open the union ranks.... This provision in the bill
is an attempt to solve difficult problems of industrial democracy by recourse to over-simplified
legal devices." NLRB, Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act 921 (1948).
Senator Morse stated: "We do not help the patriotic membership of [noncomplying] unions
by requiring them to strike in order to protect the economic rights and benefits which other
workers enjoy." Ibid., at 5,559. See also the remarks of Senator Murray, ibid., at i,o49.
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Section 9(h) provides that:
No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question... concerning the
representation of employees, raised by a labor organization,... no petition [for a

union shop] shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to ...
[an unfair labor practice] charge made by a labor organization... unless there is on
file with the Board... [a non-Communist] affidavit executed contemporaneously or
within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of such labor organization
and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an
affiliate or constituent unit .... 6
In the representation and union shop cases, the Board and the courts have
had little difficulty in carrying out the intent behind the Section. In cases involving unfair labor practices, however, considerable difficulty has been encountered in attempting to resolve the conflict between the provision and the
Act as a whole. It is relevant to examine the rules developed in these three
types of cases to determine their limitations and practical impact.
REP SENTAflON AND U~NoN Snop CAsEs

Where a noncomplying union not previously recognized by the employer or
certified by the Board is unable to achieve recognition through its economic
strength, Section 9 (h) sometimes imposes serious disabilities. Such a union can
neither petition for nor participate in an election7 and, since it cannot be certified, it will not have the protection which the Act grants to certified unions
against striking rivals.8 The Board has prevented possible circumvention of the
statute by adopting the so-called "fronting" rule. Under that rule, an individual
ascertained to be acting in behalf of a noncomplying union will be denied a
place on the ballot, 9 despite the fact that the filing requirements do not ordinarily relate to individuals.o So, too, a national complying union may not appear in behalf of its noncomplying local,"y even where the local does not participate in collective bargaining.1"
Where the noncomplying union is the subject of a decertification proceed6
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 9 (h), 6i Stat. 146 (i947), 29 U.S.C.A.

§ i59(h) (Supp., i95o).

Sigmund Cohn Mfg. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 377 (i947). The rule applies even where the employer requests an election. Herman Loewenstein, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 377 (1947). Ordinarily,
the employer may petition for an election when presented with claims from rival unions.
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 9(c)(i)(B), 6x Stat. i44 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 159(c)(I)(B) (Supp., 1950).
8Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 8(b) (4) (C), 6i Stat. 14X (1947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ i58(b)(4)(C) (Supp., 1950).
9 Oppenheim Collins & Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 435 (1948); Campbell Soup Co., 76 N.L.R.B.
950 (1948).

1o Hofman Packing Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 6oi (1949); Acme Boot Mfg. Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 44i
(1948).
" United States Gypsum Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1o98 (1948). Earlier, the Board had held the
local's compliance status immaterial. Lion Oil Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 565 (1948); Warshawsky
& Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1291 (1948).

2Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 8i N.L.R.B. 2951(X949).
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ing,13 however, it will appear on the ballot. 14 "To hold otherwise," said the
Board, "would confer upon noncomplying unions the power to immunize
themselves against decertification proceedings by their very refusal to comply.. ."is Ifthe noncomplying union wins, the Board will not certify the
union, but only the arithmetic results of the election. 16
The Board is forbidden by Section 9(h) to entertain a union shop petition
presented by a noncomplying union. Unless the Board has certified that a majority of the employees authorized a union shop agreement, it would be an unfair labor practice for a union to force an employer to carry out such an agreement. 17 It is thus clear that a noncomplying union cannot lawfully attain a
union shop either through NLRB facilities s or through its own economic
strength.19 '
UN:FAiR LABOR PRAcTICEs: DUTY TO BARGAIN CASES
Under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act"' an employer is guilty of an unfair labor
practice if he refuses to bargain with the representative of the majority of his
employees. Whether an employer is relieved of the duty to bargain with a majority union which has not complied with Section 9(h) becomes important
where a complying union brings charges based upon a refusal to bargain which
occurred while it was not in compliance.2 Although a majority union could
normally, upon compliance, force the employer to bargain through a new
demand for recognition, it might have lost its majority status before complying.
Where the union is initially insecure in its hold on the membership, the absence
of a duty to bargain could lead to this result. On the other hand, a holding
13Decertification applies to a union either certified by the Board or currently recognized by
the employer. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 9(c) (i)
(A) (ii), 61 Stat. 144 (1947),
29 U.S.C.A. § i59(c)(z)(A)(ii) (Supp., ig5o).
'4 Harris Foundry & Machine Co., 76 N.L.R.B. xi8 (1948).
isIbid., at 120.
16 Stauffer Chemical Co. of Texas, 85 N.L.R.B.
595 (1949).
'7 Section 8(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to force an employer to
discriminate against an employee for non-membership in the union. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29
U.S.C.A. § i58(b)(2) (Supp., I95O). Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to carry out a union shop agreement unless the Board has certified that a majority
of the employees authorized the agreement. 6i Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(3)
(Supp., 195o).
Is H. C. Godman Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 130 (1948).
"gCf. Simons v. Retail Clerks Union, 21 L.R.R.M. 2685 (Cal. Super. Ct., 1948). In Julius
Resnick, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 38 (i949), where a union security provision was illegally inserted
into a contract, the employer was ordered to withhold recognition until the union had been
certified by the Board. See also Hager & Sons Hinge Mfg. Co., So N.L.R.B. 163 (1948). The
Board, of course, will not certify a noncomplying union and it appears that no agency other
than the NLRB can conduct a valid union shop election. NLRB Release R-48 (Mar. io, 1948).
20 61

Stat. 141 (I947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(5) (Supp., 195o).

2 No complaint can issue, however, based upon a practice occurring more than six months
prior to the filing of the charge. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § xo(b), 61 Stat.

146 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 16o(b) (Supp., :95o).
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that the employer was under a duty to bargain despite the union's noncompliance would probably result in an order to bargain irrespective of the union's
loss of membership, such loss being attributed to the commission of the unfair
labor practice.2" Strikers would have to be reinstated 3 and, if necessary,
workers hired to replace them would have to be discharged.4
In Andrews Co.' 5 the Board held that in such a case the employer is under
no duty to bargain 6 even where the union's noncompliance was not a factor
influencing his behavior. Since the statute creates both the right and the
remedy, the Board reasoned, "a limitation on the remedy is to be treated as a
limitation on the right itself."'27 Furthermore, a contrary holding would permit
the circumvention of the Section, since a noncomplying union "could compel
recognition by the mere threat of subsequent compliance and the filing of a
8
charge."'
The Board's holding in the Andrews case was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in West Texas Utilities v. NLRB.29 The court
argued that the obligation to bargain imposed by Section 8(a) (5)is unqualified
unless something in Section 9 (h) relieves the employer of that obligation where
union officers fail to comply. It found that nothing in the latter section so
limited the employer's duty since "[tihe Act's only sanction for noncompliance
22NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 31o U.S. 318 (1940); Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 73
N.L.R.B. 1339 (1947).
23Harris-Woodson Co., 77 N.L.R.B.

8i 9

(1948). The Board is empowered, with respect to

unfair labor practices, "to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act." Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 147 (I47), 29 U.S.C.A. § i6o(c) (Supp., 1950).
24 E.g., Harris-Woodson Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 819 (,948).
2S

87 N.L.R.B. 379 (i949).

The Board believed that the result reached was required by its prior decision in Marshall
and Bruce Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 90 (1947). In that case, the complaint had issued and the case
was pending determination at the time the Act went into effect. The Board found that the
employer had violated the duty to bargain, and also that it had the power to issue a remedial
order despite the union's noncompliance. However, on the issue of how that power was to be
exercised, the Board held that an unconditional order would be tantamount to certification
of the union. Since they could not "believe that Congress intended the full force of Government to be brought to bear upon an employer to require him to bargain in the future with a
Union which we now lack authority to certify," the order to bargain was conditioned on the
union's compliance within thirty days. Ibid., at 96. If, after the Board's order, the union again
demanded recognition, subsequently complied and brought charges, a situation like that in
the Andrews case would be presented. Holding that the employer should have bargained with
the union while it was not in compliance would be an anomalous result, particularly if the
union's request for recognition, but not its compliance, had occurred less than thirty days
after the Board's order. A result similar to the Marshall and Bruce Decision was reached in
26

Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. i (1948), aff'd Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 17o F. 2d 247 (C.A.
7th, 1948), aff'd sub nom. American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382

(i95o) on the issue of the constitutionality of Section 9(h).
27Andrews Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 379, 382 (i949).
28bid.
29 184

F.

2d

233 (App. D.C., 1950).
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is denial of Board facilities." 3 0 Moreover, the court thought that limiting the
obligation would be inconsistent with the statutory language. The Board is
forbidden to issue a complaint on behalf of a union unless it has on file affidavits
'z
executed "contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period."'
Therefore, it reasoned, the statute contemplated that the unfair labor practice which was the subject of the complaint might have arisen before the union
had complied.32
3
Recently, in New Jersey Carpet Mills, InC., the Board has followed the

West Texas decision 34 and has overruled its own holding in the Andrews case.
Here, as in Andrews Co., the employer did not rely upon the union's noncompliance as a justification for his refusal to bargain. The Board, in a three-to-two
decision, held that the employer's refusal to bargain constituted an 8(a)(5)
violation. One of the majority, Chairman Herzog, suggested that the employer
should not be found guilty of an unfair labor practice where he contemporaneously notifies the union that its noncompliance is the basis for his refusal to
bargain. In such circumstances, "realism should oblige the Board to recognize
not only that the employer's position may well be consistent with a good-faith
recognition of the basic principle of collective bargaining, but that its very
assertion will tend to encourage early union compliance ....

35 In a special

concurring opinion, the other two members of the majority declined to take a
30 Ibid., at 239.
3'Labor Management Relations Act of i947, § 9(h), 6i Stat. 146 (i947), 29 U.S.C.A.
§ i59(h) (Supp., ig5o).
32 While the court appears to have relied heavily on the use of the word "contemporaneously," the argument would be precisely the same were the court to rely only on the words
"within the preceding twelve-month period."
33 2

CCH Lab. L. Rep.

io,5oi, 92 N.L.R.B. No.

122 (1950).

The Board might have treated the decision of the West Texas case on this point as dictum. The union in that case had been in compliance at all times, but its parent federation had
not. The court agreed with the Board's holding in Northern Virginia Broadcasters, Inc.,
75 N.L.R.B. ii (1947) (in which the Board rejected a prior opinion of its own General Counsel)
and held that the federations ordinarily were not "labor organizations" within the meaning
of the Act. "Even if it were true that federation officers were required to file and had failed
to do so," the court then went on to argue, "the failure... does not in any way relieve an
employer of the paramount obligation to bargain collectively in good faith." West Texas
Utilities v. NLRB, 184 F. 2d 233, 239 (App. D.C., i95o). On the issue of whether or not the
AFL and CIO must comply with the requirements of Section 9(h), the West Texas decision
has in effect been overruled by the Supreme Court's recent decision in NLRB v. Highland
Park Mfg. Co., B.N.A. Daily Labor Report No. 94, at D-i (i95i). The West Texas case is
being appealed. 6 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 9ooo (ig5i).
34

3s B.N.A. Daily Labor Report No. 241, at E-7 (ig5o). This situation actually arose in
Hoover Co. v. United Electrical Workers, iS CCH Lab. Cas. 64,613 (Ohio C.P., z948).
The company based its refusal to negotiate a contract on the union's noncompliance, but the
court held that such a refusal violated the spirit of the Taft-Hartley Act and ordered the employer to bargain. Similar situations were also presented in United Electrical Workers v.
Lilienthal, 84 F. Supp. 640 (D.C., 1949) and in Remington Rand, Inc., 78 N,L,RB. 181
(1948), but the cases were disposed of on other grounds.
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stand on the hypothetical situation envisaged by Chairman Herzog. 6 Regardless of their position in such a case, however, unless the Board is reconstructed
it is probable that Herzog's rule will be decisive.37
The Herzog rule, like the "substantive" interpretation of Section 9(h) developed in the Andrews case, finds little justification in the language of the
Section. The "procedural" rule of the West Texas case seems consistent with
that language, although the court's interpretation is not free from doubt. It
could be argued that the reference to affidavits filed within the preceding
twelve-month period was designed to protect only those unions whose compliance had lapsed after a demand for recognition had been refused while the
union was in compliance.-a On the other hand, it has been argued that the
legislative history of Section 8(a)(5) supports the West Texas interpretation.
The House bill would have amended Section 8(5) of the Wagner Act 39by limiting the employer's obligation to bargain to situations in which a union was
already recognized or certified.40 Congress' rejection of this proposal has been
taken as evidence of an intent to leave unqualified the employer's obligation
to bargain with a majority union.4 But this legislative history is not necessarily persuasive. The rejection of the House proposal can be explained on the
ground that Congress was unwilling to make a general change in the employer's
duty to bargain and that its failure to enact this proposal is neutral as an indication of congressional intent regarding the specific and narrow problem of the
duty to bargain with a noncomplying union.
While the "substantive" rule attempts to solve the conflict between the intent behind Section 9 (h) and the over-all objectives of the Act by giving effect
36 B.N.A. Daily Labor Report No. 241, at E-ro (1950).
37 It may be, however, that Chairman Herzog would not apply his rule in every case where
the employer relies on the union's noncompliance. Parts of his opinion indicate that the rule is
based upon an unwillingness to let an employer who shows contempt for the collective bargaining principle avail himself of a"windfall"in a later discovery of the union's noncompliance.
Because of such behavior on the part of the employer, the assertion of the union's noncompliance would not be consistent with a good faith recognition of the basic principle of collective bargaining. Surely, as to that employer, the union's noncompliance would be no less a
windfall if discovered sooner, rather than later. Indeed, in Tennessee Egg Co., 27 L.R.R.M.
'479, 1481 n. 13, 93 N.L.R.B. No. 141 (ig5i), Chairman Herzog found "no merit in the
Respondent's contention that this case falls within the principle he espoused in theNew Jersey
Carpet case. The respondent herein did not contemporaneously notify the Union that the
latter [sic] noncompliance was the reason for its refusal to bargain, nor indeed is there any

proof that it was motivated thereby" (emphasis added).

38 The House Bill would have denied certification to a union any of whose officers were members of the Communist Party. H.R. 3020, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (i947), at § 9(f)(6). In order
to relieve the Board of the task of determining whether union officers were Communists, the
affidavit provision and the present language of Section 9(h) were substituted for the House
proposal in the conference agreement. Consult remarks of Senator Taft, NLRB, op. cit. supra
note 5, at x,542. It could thus be argued that the particular language employed is necessary
only because of the affidavit device and that there was no intent to make the Section apply
retroactively in behalf of unions which complied after the unfair labor practice was committed.
39 49 Stat. 453 (1935).

40H.R. 3020, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (1947), at § 8(a)(5).
New Jersey Carpet Mills, Inc., B.N.A. Daily Labor Report No. 241, at E-6 (i95o).

4
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in all cases to the former, the "procedural" rule recognizes the latter as paramount. The Herzog rule is an attempt to compromise between these extremes.
Under that rule, no important sacrifice of the Act's broader objectives need be
made, since the intent behind Section 9(h) will be effectuated only where the
employer's conduct is consistent with his acceptance of the collective bargaining principle. A further advantage of the rule is that it would encourage disclosure to a possibly misinformed membership of the reason for the employer's
refusal to negotiate and thereby weaken the position of noncomplying officials.
OTHER UwrAn LABOR PRACTICE CASES

The choice between effectuating the intent behind Section 9(h) and other
objectives of the Act in cases arising under the first four subsections of Section
8(a) has been made without the difficulties which were anticipated.42 These
subsections are designed to protect employees in their organizational activities;43 to prevent domination of the union by the employer;44 to prevent discrimination against union members;45 and to protect employees giving testimony under the Act.46 Section 9 (h) precludes a noncomplying union from
bringing charges based on these subsections.
Nevertheless, the rulings in these cases greatly reduce the disabilities of noncompliance. The Board early distinguished between these charges and Section
8(a)(5) charges so far as Section 9 (h) was concerned.47 The Andrews case itself
held that a complying union could bring other than Section 8(a)(5) charges
against the employer for acts committed prior to compliance.4 Since such acts
injured individual employees, the Board held that the noncompliance of the
union could not be raised as a defense by the employer. In NLRB v. Augusta
Chemical Co.,49 charges previously dismissed because of the noncompliance of
the complaining union were brought by individual members of the union. The
employer's contention that the "fronting" rule should apply was rejected even
though it was known that the union was actually preparing the case. The
Board has even allowed charges to be brought by officers s ° and attorneys5s
of noncomplying unions.

52

42Consult Kearns, Non-Communist Affidavits Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 37 Geo. L.J.
297 (1949).

43 6i Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.CA. § 158(a) (i) (Supp., i95o).
44 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § i58(a)(2) (Supp., 1950).
4s 61 Stat. 140 (i947), 29 U.S.C.A. § i58(a)(3) (Supp., i95o).
46 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(4) (Supp., i95o).

47 Pioneer Electric Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 117 (1947); Marshall and Bruce Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 90
(1947).

48 Andrews Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 379 (1949).
49 6 CCH Lab. L. Rep.

66,177 (C.A. 5th, i95i), enforcing 83 N.L.R.B. 53 (ig49).
9997, 89 N.L.R.B. No. rig (i95o).

soLuzerne Hide & Tallow Co., CCH Lab. L. Rep.
51Olin Industries, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 203 (i949).

s In these cases the Board relied on Section io(b) of the Act, under which unfair labor
practice charges may be brought by anyone. 61 Stat. 146 (i947), 29 U.S.C.A. § i6o(b) (Supp.,
i95o). It is almost certain, however, that the Board would not go so far as to act on an 8(a) (5)
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It is questionable whether sufficient attention has been given to the problem
inherent in these cases. True, a rule which prevents a noncomplying union from
filing unfair labor practice charges imposes some disability in that it may
affect the union's prestige and provide propaganda for rival organizations.
But it is significant that so long as an individual may file such charges in behalf of a noncomplying union, the union's organizational activities can effectively be protected from antagonistic employers. It would seem that the intent
behind Section 9 (h) would best be effectuated in these cases by application of
the "fronting" rule where it is clear that the primary benefit of the Board's
order would accrue to a noncomplying union.
LIMITATIONS OF SECTION 9(H)

The disabilities imposed by Section 9 (h) have helped to bring about the
53
compliance of a substantial majority of unions subject to the Act. It is not
clear, however, that the provision has had a decisive effect in eliminating Communist officers from the labor movement. Many unions never had such officers.
Others have rid their ranks of Communists on their own initiative as a result of
the same forces which led to the passage of Section 9 (h) and which have since
54
been accentuated by the Korean war.
Many unions have achieved technical compliance without yielding to the
spirit of the Section. Where officers would not, or could not file affidavits, they
have often been cloaked with lesser titles so as not to be included in the list of
"officers" submitted by the union55 Although the Board's rules have been
amended in an attempt to eliminate this practice, s6it may be possible to achieve
violation brought by an individual where a noncomplying union is involved. If it did, its
order in such a case would require the employer to bargain. But it was held in Marshall and
Bruce Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 9 (1947), that an order to bargain was tantamount to certification,
a step which the Board is forbidden to take in behalf of a noncomplying union. See also Luzerne
Hide &Tallow Co., CCH Lab. L. Rep. 9997, 89 N.L.R.B. No. xi (i95o), where the Board
distinguishes between 8 (a)(5) and other charges when brought by individuals.
53 "Today the United Mine Workers stands in lonely magnificance [sic] as the sole major
unit outside the 9(h) fold." Shair, How Effective is the Non-Communist Affidavit?, i CCH
Lab. L.J. 935,

940

(1950)- On June 30, 1950,

213

national and international unions were in

compliance. Of the 22,697 local unions which had complied at one time or another, however,
11,353 had permitted their filing of affidavits to lapse. NLRB, Fifteenth Annual Report 18
(1950). This may merely reflect the fact that contracts are being entered into for greater
periods of time. Perhaps it also reflects the fact that employers generally have not seized the
opportunity to refuse to negotiate with noncomplying unions. Consult Kearns, op. cit. supra
note 41.
54 The action of the CIO, for example, in revoking the charters of several allegedly Communist-dominated unions was undertaken regardless of the fact that those unions had complied with Section 9(h). Consult Levinson, Left-Wing Labor and the Taft-Hartley Law, i CCH
Lab. L.J. 1079, IO9O (i95o).
55The Board at first considered itself helpless against this method of evasion. CraddockTerry Shoe Corp., 76 I.L.R.B. 842 (1948).
56The Board may now require affidavits from individuals it suspects are carrying on

"officer" responsibilities.

29

Code Fed. Regs. § 102.i3(c) (Cure. Supp., 1949). However, unless

there are grounds for suspicion, the list of officers submitted by the union will usually be
accepted as complete for the purposes of determining compliance. NLRB, Fifteenth Annual
Report 20 (i95o).
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compliance by having such officers "resign" their positions until Board facilities
have been successfully invoked.
Even those unions whose officers hold questionable political views will
achieve compliance upon submission of affidavits completed by such officers,
since the genuineness of affidavits will be considered only in a criminal prosecution by the Department of Justice.57 Perhaps in an effort to assure continued
Board recognition of their union and to avoid the risk of personal criminal
liability, some union officers who were *well-known Communists publicly announced their "resignations" from the Party and disavowed any belief in the
forceful overthrow of the government.5s Because of the multifarious means of
frustrating the purposes of Section 9(h), a recent congressional report criticizes
the provision as creating "a false illusion of security" with respect to the prevalence of Communists in labor unions.59
Without resorting to methods of circumvention, many unions have been
practically immune from the pressures exerted by Section (h). Except where
9
some other union has been certified,6' nothing in the Act prevents an employer
from granting recognition to a majority union, either peaceably 6 or as a result
of a strike.6 Board certification of majority status-and hence, compliance-is
not necessary where the union can establish its majority through authorization
or membership cards. 63 While the employer may challenge the sufficiency of

such proof and insist upon a Board election, 64 the challenge must proceed from
S7 Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Va., 82 N.L.R.B. 8zo (1949) (genuineness of
affidavits not a litigable issue before the Board). The Board sends those it suspects of being
false to the Department of Justice. NLRB Release R-202 (June 14, 1949). To date, however,
no prosecutions seem to have occurred. Shair, op. cit. supra note 53, at 942.
s8 Shair, op. cit. supra note 53, at 940.
59Sen. Rep. No. 99, Part I (Majority Report), 8ist Cong. ist Sess. 5r (i949).
6oSection 8(b) (4) (C) of the Act prohibits strikes for the purpose of obtaining recognition
where the certification of another is in effect. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)
(4) (C)
(Supp., ig5o). But in Douds v. Local 1250, 173 F. 2d 764 (C.A. 2d, 1949), it was held that this
section does not forbid a strike to force recognition for the purpose of "adjusting" any dispute
not provided for in an existing collective bargaining agreement even where another representative has been certified. The court's language indicates that in such circumstances the employer
and an uncertified noncomplying union can bargain with respect even to matters which heretofore were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the certified representative. Consult Collective
Bargaining, Grievance Adjustment and the Rival Union, 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1950).
61 Consult letter, Jan. 23, 1948, by Labor Solicitor Tyson to Secretary of Labor Schwellenbach reprinted 21 L.R.R.M. 62.
6
2Some state courts have taken a contrary position. In Scranton Broadcasters, Inc. v.
American Communications Ass'n, 13 CCH Lab. Cas. #64,124 (Pa. C.P., 1947), a noncomplying

union's strike for recognition was enjoined; and in Fulford v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., i8
Ind. App. 326, 77 N.E. 2d 755 (1948), the union's noncompliance was held to forfeit the protection which otherwise would have been afforded by the state anti-injunction law. It is also
interesting to note that the absence of a non-Communist provision in a state labor statute
was held to be so inconsistent with the N.L.R.A. as to prevent the NLRB from ceding jurisdiction over a case to the state agency. Kaiser-Frazer Parts Corp., So N.L.R.B. o50 (1948).
6
3Harris-Woodson Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 89 (1948).
6
4Georgia Twine & Cordage Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 84 (948).
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a bona fide doubt as to the union's majority.5 Furthermore, where the union's
majority status has been certified by the Board within the prior year, it cannot
be challenged by the employer, regardless of the union's present noncompliance . 6 Even after expiration of the year, a presumption of continuing majority
status exists. 67 Where an election is held without the participation of the noncomplying union, the ability to prevent rival organizations from obtaining a
majority in that contest 68 will protect the union against certification of others
for at least a year. 69 In a like manner, certification of rivals can be prevented
70
where the noncomplying union has a current contract with the employer.
Because of these circumstances, it would appear that the Section is least
effective where more powerful unions are involved. This seems anomalous since
Congress was presumably most concerned over the threat to commerce and national security inherent in the Communist domination of such unions.7' In
this respect it is significant that the rules worked out in the unfair labor practice cases help prevent loss of strength. On the other hand, such unions, because of their inability to appear on the ballot or achieve a union shop, have
suffered losses through the "raiding" tactics of rival complying organizations72
But even if the union is so weakened that it lacks the economic power to strike
for recognition, so long as it maintains a majority the demise of the Andrews
rule may discourage the employer from refusing to bargain.
THE INTERNATIONAL SHOE DOCTRINE AND JURISDICTION ON THE BASIS OF ACTS
Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co.' is the first case interpreting and
testing the validity of a Maryland statute extending the area of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Section 19(d) of that statute provides that
6s John Deere Plow Co. of St. Louis, 82 N.L.R.B. 69 (1949); D. H. Holmes Co., 8i N.L.R.B.
753 (1949). "Whether in a particular case an employer is acting in good or bad faith, is of
course a question which of necessity must be determined in the light of all the relevant facts in
the case. Among the factors pertinent to a determination of the employer's motive at the time
of the refusal to bargain are any unlawful conduct of the employer, the sequence of events,
and the lapse of time between the refusal and the unlawful conduct." Artcraft Hosiery Co.,
78 N.L.R.B. 333, 334 (X948).
66Shawnee Milling Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 1266 (i949).
67 Dorsey Trailers, Inc., So N.L.R.B. 478 (1948).
68 The noncomplying union is permitted to campaign against its rival. Woodmark InduEtries, Inc., So N.L.R.B. 1105 (1948).
69 No election can be held within one year after a valid election has been conducted. Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, at § 9(c)(3), 6i Stat. I44 (i947), 29 U.S.C.A. § X59(c) (3)
(Supp., 195o).
70 Aluminum Co. of America, 85 N.L.R.B. 915 (i949). In the absence of a contract, however,
the noncomplying union has not even the standing to file objections to the conduct of the
election. Times Square Stores Corp., 79 N.L.R.B. 361 (1948).
71See, e.g., the remarks of Representative Hartey, NLRB, op. cit. supra note 5 at 613.
72 Consult Levinson, op. cit. supra note s4 at ro87 et seq.
189 F. Supp. 654 (D.C. Md., ig5o).

